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The War on Drugs 
David Jakubiec, Andrew Kilcer, and William Sager 
Introduction 
America is in an epic battle, not against a foreign country but to keep you and every other citizen 
from putting a certain list of chemicals in your body.  Since President Nixon, this battle has been 
labeled "The War on Drugs".  This battle is extremely expensive: total cost to local, state and 
federal government equals $19.2 billion a year.  In a country of approximately 300 million that 
equates to $64 per person (Elsner, p. 22).  All of these resources are used in an effort to keep 
people from getting high.  What do Americans get for 64 dollars a year; they get "4,348 [drug 
related] arrests a day, or one every 20 seconds" (Elsner, 2006, p. 20).  All these arrests contribute 
to America's enormous inmate population of over 2 million (p. 13).  For each of those inmates, 
the government spends $34,000 a year to have the honor of keeping them as wards of the state 
(p. 16). 
 Like all wars, the War on Drugs is obsessed with catching the ring leader, or big fish.  
This obsession has had international and domestic reproductions.   The Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) when first formed, operated all mostly entirely domestic.  It now 
maintains agents in over 40 countries (Cooper, 95).  Back home, police agencies seize billions of 
dollars in "illegal" private assets, and in most cases pocket the profit.  The largest impact from 
the War on Drugs is by far the isolation and classification of minorities as second-class citizens.    
African Americans now account for 40 percent of the prison population while only 12 percent of 
the United States (US) population (Elsner, 2006, p. 13). 
 
Drug Roots International 
The roots to America's War on drugs lie deep in the history of the 20th century and some 
even from before.  The first real global drug confrontation took place well back in the 1780s and 
up until the mid 1900s was between Great Britain and China (Brook, 2000, p. 31).  During those 
years the British East India Company formed the modern equivalent of the Columbian drug 
cartel.  The East India Company began official control of the opium smuggling trade between 
India and China in 1781 in an effort to maintain "stable financial footing during the American 
revolutionary war" (p. 32).  Opium importation to China eventually reached over 9.5 million 
pounds in 1850  (McAllister, 2002, p. 13).  The fact that opiates where banned throughout China 
eventually lead to the Opium Wars in the 1840s and again in the 1850s.  By the late 1800s, 
Britain had grown weary of its never-ending struggle with China and in 1911 attended The 
Hague Conventions in which its members pledged to restrict opium trafficking. 
Drug Roots Enter America 
 America had bought right in to Asia's opium problem when it gained control of the 
Philippines following the Spanish American War (McAllister, 2002, p. 27).  The Philippines 
maintained a government regulated opium market, that "offended American moral sensibilities, 
particularly among temperance advocates and supporters of missionary activities" (p. 27).  
Washington quickly implemented a policy of "suppression, excepting medical needs" for the 
Philippines (p. 27).  If anything the Philippines made America even more acute to the perceived 
"evils" of Narcotics (p. 28).  This eventually led to President Roosevelt to call for The Hague 
Conventions.   
 
The Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914 
 Back home, America's response to the Hague conference was the passage of The 
Harrison Narcotics Act 1914 (McAllister, 2000, p. 35).  This law changed the way Americans 
dealt with narcotics forever.  The act required all distributors of drugs to apply for a tax stamp (p. 
35).  Crafted by Hamilton Wright, the act was originally intended as a revenue generator. 
However, it was quickly used to reign in sales for addiction purposes, which were not viewed as 
medically necessary under the act (p. 35).  From the Harrison Narcotics Act, drugs drifted in and 
out of American focus throughout the roaring 20s.  It was not until the 1930s in the middle of the 
Great Depression that America would make its next big move against drug use. 
Harry Anslinger's War on a Weed 
 During the 1930s, the federal government reorganized its various drug polices under a 
new agency called the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) (Isralowitz, 2002, p. 89).  This new 
agency was to be headed by Harry Anslinger, who in 1934 embarked on campaign to rid the 
country of marijuana.  Interestingly, Anslinger until that year showed no interest in wishing to 
control marijuana (p. 133).  Anslinger used a combination of spreading unfound claims against 
marijuana though propaganda, and playing on the public's fear of minorities, by associating 
marijuana use with "lower-class Mexican Americans and African Americans who had initiated 
use of the drug and made the drug even more dangerous to the white middle-class" (p. 134).  
This public fear allowed Anslinger to secure the passage of the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, 
which levied a tax on marijuana, making it nearly financially impossible to obtain legally.  All in 
all, the price of a marijuana cigarette "increased 6 to 12 times to about a dollar" (p. 134).  This 
price, taken in the middle of the Great Depression, was a fortune.   
Nixon's Perception 
 While running for president in 1968, Nixon like all presidents needed to stand apart from 
his opponents, and his case for doing so was America's unknown drug "problem" (Musto, p. 38). 
Due to the social upheavals of the 1960s, by the end of 1968 heroin use among college students 
had risen from 3.2 to 5.14 percent (p. 38).  Among high school students, use had risen from less 
than 1 percent to 3.3 percent (p. 38).  In addition, marijuana use from 1960 to 1966 had increased 
threefold among eighteen to twenty-four year olds (p. 38).  While drug use, particularly 
marijuana use, was increasing in the United States, it was dwarfed in the public's eye by other 
more pressing concerns, primarily the Vietnam War (p. 39).  In the beginning of May 1969, in a 
White House survey on domestic issues, only 3 percent listed drugs as a issue of importance (p. 
39).   
Nixon's Policy Takes Shape 
 Nixon realized that in the political environment of the late 1960s and 1970s getting major 
new legislation on drugs was going to be difficult to say the least (p. 40).  Nixon announced his 
"War on Drugs" during a special address to Congress on "Control of Narcotics and Dangerous 
Drugs" (p. 60).  This was to be followed the introduction of Senate bill 2637 and an enormous 
political battle that followed in its wake (p. 60).  The bill had three main purposes: "[1] provide 
more meaningful regulation over legitimate sources of drugs, [2] to strengthen law enforcement 
against illicit drug traffic, and [3] to eliminate some of the inconsistencies in the present 
regulation of drugs” (p. 61).  While Congress was debating his bill, Nixon focused his efforts on 
items that existed already under executive power.  Primarily on foreign policy with countries that 
exported narcotics, and law enforcement though the various federal and state agencies (p. 41).  
Operation Intercept 
 Operation Intercept began in September 1969 in response to the events of the summer 
months, which included "Woodstock" where an estimated 90 percent of the some 400,000 
present where smoking pot at the event (p. 64).  Intercept was originally to include forbidding 
military personal from visiting Tijuana and other Mexican border towns.  However, after a copy 
of Operation Intercept was leaked to the press on September 9th and several meetings with 
Mexican officials this portion of the operation was never enacted (p. 64).  On September 21, 
Operation Intercept officially went into effect, despite enormous public opposition.  Customs 
agents by October 6th of that year had seized over 1,830 pounds of marijuana, as well as various 
other drugs from vehicular search alone (p. 65).  Another 165 pounds were sized from the marine 
searches as well as over 1,000 pounds intercepted on airplanes (p. 66).  Intercept however highly 
degraded Washington-Mexican relations, as well as being unpopular in border towns (p. 67).  
This resulted in "Operation Cooperation," in which the Mexican government promised to crack 
down on its side of the border if US Customs relaxed its search measures (p. 67).     
The Drug Enforcement Administration 
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was officially established July 1, 1973 and 
quickly got off to "a less-than-propitious beginning" (p. 145).  The "overall policy of the DEA to 
pursue major players in the illicit drug trade evaporated as individual agents still operated on the 
assumption that their own success depended on number of arrests made and quantity of drugs 
seized" (p. 145).  This resulted in large infighting, as officers raced to fill the newly formed but 
not yet filled administrative positions in the agency (p. 147).  Upon its creation, the DEA was 
supposed to work closely with US Customs as well as the Justice Department.  However, due to 
confrontation between different mangers brought from the two respective departments, this 
seemed like a dream (p. 149).  The DEA and Customs in particular continued to butt heads until 
December 1975 with a signing of "a memorandum of understanding" between the two agencies 
(p. 151).   
The Gerald Ford Change-Over 
 Upon Nixon's resignation and taking office on August 9, 1974, Ford inherited a mess not 
only in a country but also among his cabinet, including the newly formed Drug Enforcement 
Administration (p. 143).  One of the primary reasons was the fact that public opinion was 
focused on other issues facing the country.  "There were also disagreements between the Justice 
Department and the Treasury Department about the value of IRS involvement in tax fraud 
investigations of people suspected of drug trafficking" (p. 143).  The infighting, along with 
lacking public support for drugs controls, caused Ford’s administration to create the White Paper 
on Drug Abuse.  The White Papers officially shifted policy towards minimizing the negative 
side-effects of drug use, rather than direct enforcement (Musto, p. xx).   
The Rise of Cocaine 
"During the early 1980s, cocaine abuse in the United States maintained epidemic status. 
Estimates from the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse indicate that in 1994 there were 
1.4 million active cocaine users in the United States" (Isralowitz, 2002, p. 109).  In the late 1970s 
and into the early 1980s, America was introduced to a new form of cocaine: "Crack" (p. 110).  
"When heated, the crystals make a popping sound, and this characteristic sound is the origin of 
the term crack" (p. 110).  The impact of crack in terms of dollar amount was substantial; cocaine 
along with crack were particularly popular with women, leading to the term "crack baby" for the 
children they bore while addicted to the substance (p. 111).  National estimates place total health 
and care cost for all crack babies in the 1990s at $2.5 billion (p. 111).  With the image of crack 
babies and the apparent millions of crack addicts, media frenzy ensured, allowing President 
Reagan and latter President H. W. Bush to secure millions for their war on drug (p. 111). 
President Ronald Reagan 
 Shortly after taking officer Reagan rejuvenated the war on drugs, with an enormous 
emphasis on supply side enforcement never seen before (Cooper, 2002).  "80 percent of the $1.3 
billion 1982 drug budget was earmarked for programs intend to reduce the supply of banned 
substances"(Cooper, 2002).  Overall under Reagan funding for the "war on drugs" doubled "from 
$800 million in 1981 to $1.9 billion" by 1987 (Cooper, 2002).  "Gradually, it turned into a real 
war involving the U.S. Customs Service, Coast Guard, Border Patrol, Department of Defense, 
Federal Aviation Administration, the intelligence agencies and even NASA"(Alexandrova, p. 
95).  The DEA in particular increased its operations to "more than 40 foreign countries" (p.95). 
George H. W. Bush 
President Reagan’s successor, President H. W. Bush, continued the policy of massive military 
and law enforcement involvement to stop supply side narcotics (Cherry, 2002, p. 64). "The Bush 
plan was to increase military and other law enforcement efforts in the Andean region to stop 
cocaine production at its source"(p.64). The Andean region lies along the western coast of South 
America. Bush’s operations, particularly in Colombia, did little to stem the flow of coca leaves; 
if anything it just shifted production from large farms to smaller ones (p.64).  In addition to 
Colombia Bush's administration focused its efforts on the small country of Panama (p.64).  
Panama's leader, Manuel Noriega, was wanted on charges of drug smuggling and money-
laundering (p.64).  Eventually on December 20, 1989 President Bush authorized Operation Just 
Cause, which subsequently resulted in the invasion of Panama and the capture of President 
Noriega.  America was now directly taking over entire countries in the name of controlling the 
spread of narcotics.   
War on Drugs: A Pyrrhic Victory 
 The “War on Drugs” is not a legitimate fight. For the Federal government this is a 
Pyrrhic victory: winning the battle, but losing the war; with profits and news of massive drugs 
busts used as a money motive and political campaign strategy with a hidden agenda that has 
enslaved the lower socioeconomic classes and minorities via institutionalization. Drug policies 
have changed from rehabilitation based measures to deterrence; changing in cycles with varying 
political agendas. Policy involved with the War on Drugs has caused more of a multifaceted 
social schism (between law enforcement and minorities; whites and blacks; social classes), 
abandoning the true goal of fighting a pandemic, i.e. drug addiction.  
The War on Drugs is skewed in terms of its varying degrees of justice for the poor and 
the rich. Crimes committed in different environments are treated differently: from urban open air 
drug markets to international money laundering scandals. Those who are most likely to get away 
with drug related crimes are those at the top of the economic class system. The only way to 
effectively get away with mass sale of illicit drugs is to be able to effectively launder resources 
and profits. This is something that is improbable and unlikely for the poor.  
The War on Drugs has augmented domestic society by increasing the discretion and 
power of the police. Internationally it has promoted imperialism with our presence in major drug 
producing countries around the globe. Internationally the problem is contained and displaced: 
happening in a vicious cycle- moving from place to place as resources focus on certain hot spot 
regions at different times. The Balloon Effect of containment is described in the World Drug 
Report 2008 as “squeezing (by tighter controls) in one place produces a swelling (namely, an 
increase) in another place, though the net effect may be an overall reduction” (World Drug 
Report 2008, p.216). Markets shift as interdiction effects one illicit market at a time. For policies 
to be true success all aspects of the drug trade must be contained simultaneously- something that 
would be impossible with given resources. 
The change that needs to be made in the International Drug War is not only the 
development of new markets for foreign lands whose primary Gross Domestic Product stems 
from opium or cocaine production; but the concern for public health, and enforcement of the 
laws on an even level- not the continued advantages for cartels and other mafia members of the 
majority who have laundered large sums of money. Lastly, the stigma relating to drug abuse in 
the Western civilized world must be relinquished. By prohibiting drug use we have created an 
illegal Black Market that is alive and well. We must now effectively control and contain it and 
deal with side effects accordingly, both internationally and domestically.  
What can we consider “winning” in the War on Drugs? If it is decreased production- we 
have failed. If it’s decreased the global spread of the epidemic-we have failed. If it’s containing 
key drug production areas- we have succeeded. If winning the “War on Drugs” mean enforcing 
strict and unjust laws on addicts who have little social mobility or legitimate means for work- we 
have won. Unfortunately, the system has proven to be successful abroad at containment in key 
production areas and has failed at fighting the drug problem in America. 
Public Opinion 
Public opinion is neither in favor of the abolition of drugs nor in support of the “War on 
Drugs.” In a July 2002 poll 84% of participants supported spending on treatment programs and 
92% of participants supported spending on drug prevention programs (n=1,360). Participants in 
the survey were from culturally diverse backgrounds and were nearly even split between sexes. 
The participants came from the highly populated cities of N.Y.C., Philadelphia, L.A., Chicago, 
and Houston (Lock, Timberlake, & Rasinski, 2002, p.385). People from urban settings are more 
greatly affected by the open-air drug market; their street corners are more often used as 
distribution centers. The social effects of drugs and drug sales are augmented by households that 
are headed by a single parent because of the skewed minority incarceration rate since the 
enactment of harsh drug laws, e.g. Rockefeller Drug Laws and mandatory minimums.   
Drug Policies as a Social Control Mechanism 
Cracking down on the drug trade and the violent subcategories of criminals and gang 
activity is a “smoke in mirrors” approach to placing greater controls on minority groups, 
specifically, African-Americans. “Wanting to increase the number of Africans in prisons in order 
to control them more effectively, southern states enacted a series of laws targeting African- 
Americans for differential punishments” (Alexander, R., Gyamerah,J.,1997, p.108). Drug laws 
control people and unequally punish users or suspected users with searches and seizures, drug 
testing at work, sentencing disparities with mandatory minimums for nonviolent offenses, and 
discrimination based on race (The 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act).  
The 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act was an act passed by both houses as a “get tough on 
crime” measure. It called for mandatory minimums to be put in place. According to Eric E. 
Sterling, Esq., counsel to the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary from 1979 to 1989, a 
mandatory minimum sentence “is a minimum number of years, typically 5- or 10-years in prison 
that must be served when a person is convicted of a particular crime” (Sterling, Eric E., Esq., 
1999).  The unjust part of the mandatory minimums isn’t the fact that harsh sentences are being 
put in place for nonviolent drug offenses, but the sentences are determined by the amount of the 
substance held by the offender at the time of the arrest. There is a great inequality between the 
amount of crack and the amount of powder cocaine that can land you a 5-year sentence. For a 
first time offender 5 grams of crack cocaine will get you 5 years without parole. The same 5 year 
sentence is doled out for 500 grams of powder cocaine (Sterling, Eric E., Esq. 1999). The 100:1 
ratio in cocaine sentencing harshly punishes crack offenders. Crack offenders are most 
commonly found in urban areas- due to the relative potency and low cost of the drug mixture. 
Cocaine is predominately used by white people as a symbol of high status. Drug Law inequality 
existed in legislation- and went unchanged for over twenty years! This is evidence of the racial 
disparities in the Drug War. 
Even if drug policies don’t have the blatant intention of placing minorities under the 
control of the lawmakers and the majority, they have been effective in skewing punishment. 
Drug policy has maintained inequality in society- keeping minorities subjected to institutional 
racism and stagnancy in upward mobility for underprivileged social groups.  
The imbalance of this “War on Drugs” has allowed for minorities to become easier 
targets for law enforcement. Incarceration rates are skyrocketing; communities are ruined in 
violent turf wars, and once again the racial majority (white, middle class, Anglo-Americans) has 
control of the minority class because of domestic policies. This is modern day slavery. There is a 
hidden agenda, even if it is unintentional it is still a reality, there is profit being made by the 
government (police agencies in particular), and the overwhelming sense of control of  African-
Americans that take up nearly three quarters of the national prison population. The static quo is 
being maintained as whites excel, i.e. they are socially mobile while the black population 
continues to be oppressed.  
Fighting crime cannot be something that is oppressive to a nation’s own people who are 
predisposed to lives of crime, due to their lacking of economic stability and opportunity. ‘…The 
most significant action that can be taken against crime is action designed to eliminate slums and 
ghettos, to improve education, provide jobs…we shall not have dealt effectively with crime until 
we have alleviated the conditions that stimulate it’ (Tonry, M., 2005, p.85).  Crime is known to 
grow in areas where the cost of living is low, tax base is weak, education system lacking, 
parental oversight is non-existent, et al., just as a virus is known to grow in a warm and moist 
environment where it can stagnate, fester, and spread. If there could be more of an emphasis 
placed on giving a sense of direction and a diversion from drugs as a need to get by there would 
be less of a desire to throw away life with substance distribution and use. Resources should be 
pooled for vocational training and education programs and transferred from incarceration (the 
Prison Industry). Instead of focusing on rehabilitation and helping drug offenders and users we 
have drastically increased the power of the police, implemented military abroad, and expanded 
our realm of power and influence. 
Drugs and Law Enforcement 
 In 1971, the first full-time Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams were assigned to 
the Metropolitan Division of the Los Angeles Police Department (Los Angeles Police 
Department, 2006).  The brainchild of Inspector Darryl Gates, SWAT teams were an integration 
of military tactics and equipment designed to respond to situations beyond the capabilities of 
traditional patrol officers.  However, by the 1990s, SWAT teams were increasingly used to serve 
search warrants for drug dealers and users (Kopel, 2000, p. 44).  The development of SWAT was 
one of the first indications of the militarization of police forces in the United States (US).  One of 
the largest negative effects of the War on Drugs on American law enforcement is militarization. 
Stemming from the Crime Control model of criminal justice, law enforcement militarization 
changes the manner that police operate and interact with both citizens and offenders.  Spurred by 
the War on Drugs, the militarization trend in American law enforcement threatens due process 
and police public relations. 
Police Militarization 
 Boyes-Watson (2003) defines the term, “paramilitarization,” as the, “Use of military 
equipment, tactics, and weapons in policing” (p. 185).  Although the exchange of gear and ideas 
is part of the process, true law enforcement militarization encompasses the mindset, 
organization, and motivation of police forces.  A legitimate use exists for some paramilitary 
developments within the American law enforcement community.  Examples pertaining to drug 
enforcement include: infrared and night vision technology, computer communications, and 
chemical detection devices.  However, police militarization goes beyond simple technology and 
tactics similarities. Since the early 1970s, the shift towards aggressive drug enforcement shows 
that the original, narrow intent of specialized tactical units such as SWAT teams has broadened 
into a general law enforcement strategy.  King and Maguire (2004) identify militarization as a 
major transformational goal, or trend, within American police departments (p. 20).   
The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 
 The United States government has recognized the difference between law enforcement 
and the armed forces.  In 1878, the US Congress passed the principal legislation regarding the 
use of military forces in American law enforcement, the Posse Comitatus Act, also known as 18 
U.S.C. § 1385.  This statute forbids the use of, “Any part of the Army or the Air 
Force” (18 U.S.C. § 1385, 2008) for posse comitatus, or common law.  In other words, the US 
Army, Air Force, and federalized National Guard cannot be used as state law enforcement or 
peace officers.  The only exception is where police action is specifically authorized by Congress 
or the US Constitution.  
Drug Moral Panics 
 In 1971, President Richard Nixon announced the federal policy of the “War on Drugs”.  
Harsher drug legislation, along with a seemingly endless media barrage, created a moral panic 
against the plague of illicit drugs in American society.  Ted Chiricos (2003) defines this 
phenomenon as a “moral panic.”  Moral panics occur when intense media coverage of a subject 
instills artificial focus and fear into the public (as cited in Bunger et al., 2004, p. 43).  Moral 
panics intensify the public’s fear of crime, and lead to demands for increased judicial and police 
power.  For example, constant coverage of crack cocaine as the “scourge of society” in the 1980s 
led to a public outcry and the passage of even tougher drug legislation.  Police militarization has 
benefited from the drug moral panic.  When the public is faced with the image of Willie Horton, 
or the stereotypical criminal, citizens are more likely to accept a black-clad, tactical police 
officer for their defense (Boyes-Watson, 2003, p. 41).  Although unpublicized in the media, a 
far-reaching effect of the War on Drugs is the “drug-exception” to the Posse Comitatus Act 
(Blackman & Kopel, 1997, section VI).  These changes, passed in 1981 and 1988, allow the use 
of American armed forces in law enforcement when drugs are involved.  Drugs, the new 
“enemy,” formed the catalyst that American law enforcement needed in order to hasten the 
process of militarization. 
The Crime Control Model of Criminal Justice 
 The trend towards more rigid and militarized law enforcement stems from the Crime 
Control Model of criminal justice.  According to Kraska and Cubellis (1997), “Military activity 
and war remains a core feature of crime-control ideology” (as cited in Blackman & Brandl, 2004, 
p. 388).  In his book, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968), Herbert Packer outlines the 
Crime Control Model of criminal justice.  According to Packer, the Crime Control model states 
that the most important function of the criminal justice system is the “Repression of criminal 
conduct” (as cited in Bunger, Cole, & Gertz, 2004, p. 13).  Consequently, the system strives to 
“convict, apprehend, and dispose of a high proportion of criminal offenders” (p.13).  When 
applied to policing, the Crime Control Model relates most to the law enforcement function, as 
opposed to the order maintenance or service delivery roles (Scott, Personal Communication, RIT 
lecture, September 17, 2007). 
The LEAA Cements Militarization 
 In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson created the President’s Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice (Boyes-Watson, 2003, p. 185).  In response to the 
violent riots that occurred in major US cities during the early 1960s, the Commission developed 
the “War on Crime” policy.  Under this federally-funded program, the Law Enforcement 
Assistance Administration (LEAA) provided grants to state and local police departments for 
more advanced training and equipment.  The LEAA cemented the Reform Era of policing, where 
law enforcement agencies across the United States embraced rapid response, patrol, and 
centralized command and control policies in order to fight crime (p. 185).  Financial grants from 
the LEAA, many to support drug enforcement, began the large-scale militarization of American 
law enforcement. 
US Code 10 U.S.C. § 372 
 The War on Drugs led to statutes that increased the ease in which military resources 
could be used in order to support domestic law enforcement in the United States.  In 1988, 
Congress amended US Code 10 U.S.C. § 372, which specifies the use of the US military in 
homeland policing (Blackman & Kopel, 1997).  Regarding the general use of military forces, the 
code reads: 
 a) In General.— The Secretary of Defense may, in accordance with other applicable law,  make 
 available any equipment (including associated supplies or spare parts), base facility, or research facility 
 of the Department of Defense to any Federal, State, or local civilian law enforcement official for  law 
enforcement purposes (10 U.S.C. § 372, 2008). 
In essence, 10 U.S.C. § 372 permits the use of US military equipment or bases in any law 
enforcement situation, not limited to drug-related employment.  In April 2008, Congress again 
amended the law to include resources dedicated to an, “Emergency involving chemical or 
biological agents” (Cornell University, 2008). 
The War Model of Policing 
 The development of the War Model of policing is a result of ideals from the “War” on 
drugs and crime in the 1970s and 1980s.  The military model of policing traces its roots to the 
early 1950s, when Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) chief William Henry Parker 
implemented a war model of policing inside the city (Boyes-Watson, 2003, p. 167).  Beginning 
in the 1980s, the US military began large-scale adoption of the special operations military model.  
American police organizations soon followed with the development of police paramilitary units, 
or PPUs (as cited in Blackman & Brandl, 2004, p. 388).  Military units routinely train PPUs, 
often funded by federal money allocated for the War on Drugs (Kopel, 2000, p. 45).  The War 
Model of policing builds on the “War on Crime” concept, and includes military command and 
rank structure, boot-camp training, and use of military weapons and tactics.  Since its creation, 
the quasi-military organization of the War Model has become extremely common in American 
policing (p. 167).  
Militarization and the Crime Fighter Myth 
The Crime Control Model and police war mentality on crime both contribute to the idea 
that police are solely crime fighters.  According to researchers Jack Greene and Carl Klockars 
(1991), “Findings in no way lend support to the headline news vision of police work as a violent 
running battle between police and criminals” (as citied in Kappeler & Potter, 2005, p. 238).  This 
myth devalues other vital police roles, such as administrative tasks, service delivery to citizens, 
and order maintenance functions (Kappeler & Potter, 2005, p. 237).   The myth of police as 
crime fighters is dangerous because the myth has become self-perpetuating.  In other words, 
police begin to believe and act on the concept.  The self-realized role of crime fighting is a major 
justification for the continuing militarization of American law enforcement. 
Problems with the War Mentality 
 The concept that police officers are “soldiers fighting the war on crime,” (Boyes-Watson, 
2003, p. 169), creates many problems.  Due to militarized policing, offenders are often 
considered the “enemies” in the “war” of law enforcement versus law breakers (Parenti, 1999, p. 
18).  However, unlike armies or insurgencies, offenders do not wear any uniform or rally under a 
common ideology.  Thus, the war mentality forces police to employ frequent stereotypes, often 
based on race and economic class, in order to identify the “enemy” in the war on crime and drugs 
(Boyes-Watson, 2003, p. 169).  Furthermore, according to Kopel (2000), military training is not 
synonymous with successful policing because of the different missions of each profession (p. 
45). 
Police Solidarity and the Blue Curtain 
 Police solidarity and sub-culture is also affected by the militarization of police forces.  
According to Skolnick (1994), “The police, as a result of combined features of their social 
situation, tend to develop ways of looking at the world distinctive to themselves, cognitive lenses 
through which to see situations and events” (as cited in Kappeler & Potter, 2005, p. 258).  Thus, 
police officers tend to view the world as “Cops and Others,” or an “Us-vs.-Them” mentality.  
Although the nature of law enforcement creates a certain degree of camaraderie, the intense 
loyalty and secrecy created by police socialization mirrors military organizations.  The war 
mentality of policing magnifies this already present “Blue Curtain” that separates the police 
community and rest of society (Boyes-Watson, 2003, p. 165).  Police solidarity can cause 
officers to forget that they are also citizens.  Unlike active duty military organizations, police 
officers do not live on isolated bases, or abide by separate rules of justice.  The crime fighter 
myth and resulting military organization negatively bias police officers against “outsiders,” or 
other citizens. 
The Dirty Harry Problem 
 It is important to point out that most offenders are also in fact citizens of the United 
States, and consequently they still possess civil rights pursuant to the United States Constitution 
and Bill of Rights.  In the United States, the standard of “innocent until proven guilty” is 
paramount.  The militarization of policing facilitates the erroneous categorization of society into 
regular citizens and “criminals.”  This quasi-taxonomy stigmatizes convicted offenders and 
allows the degradation of civil rights, since “criminals” are viewed as different from the rest of 
society.  This phenomenon is called the Not Me Fallacy of criminal behavior (Schreck, Personal 
Communication, RIT lecture, September 11, 2008).  The Not Me fallacy results in harsher 
treatment for convicted offenders.  For example, many non-violent felony drug offenders face 
the stigma of disenfranchisement, reduced federal financial assistance, and elimination of the 
right to own a firearm.  According to the US Constitution, even convicted offenders still have a 
degree, albeit more limited, of civil rights that must be respected.  Unfortunately, police who see 
offenders as enemies are often enticed to break the law in order to make arrests, produce 
evidence during searches, and obtain information.  Carl Klockars refers to this situation as “The 
Dirty Harry Problem” (as cited in Boyes-Watson, 2003, p. 169).   The title references the 
previously mentioned Hollywood movie by the same name.  In the film, the main character, a 
police officer, employs illegal methods in order to obtain information concerning a kidnapping.  
The War on Drugs has even made it financially beneficial to stretch the law.  Asset forfeiture and 
property seizure laws allow law enforcement agencies to reap the profits of captured criminal 
property.  In short, the war mentality of policing diminishes the fact that offenders are fellow 
citizens, not enemies to destroy. 
The Paradox of Coercive Power 
 In addition to misrepresenting offenders as the enemies of society, the militarization of 
police can lead to a dangerous increase in the use of police power.  Unfortunately, an overall 
increase in police use of authority will come at a price.  Boyes-Watson (2003) refers to this 
problem as the “Paradox of coercive power” (p. 167).  The theory states that the use of power 
based on rightful authority is inversely proportional to the amount of recognized authority.  Thus, 
frequent aggressive action (ex: SWAT teams) during drug searches, will undermine police 
authority in the future.  The 1992 Los Angeles riots are an example of a situation where citizens 
refused to accept police authority.  As militarized as American police may be, they still rely on 
the cooperation and respect of citizens to maintain order. 
 
 
Mount Carmel and the Branch Davidians 
 The most recent example of the disastrous results of police militarization is the Waco, 
Texas incident of 1993.  The event involved a failed raid on the compound of the Branch 
Davidians, a religious cult, by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) on 
February 28, 1993.  On April 19, 1993, after a 51-day standoff, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) also failed to successfully control the compound.  A resulting fire destroyed 
the compound, and 74 Davidian members were killed.  The Waco disaster illustrates the ill 
effects of law enforcement militarization.  Under the drug exception clause of the Posse 
Comitatus Act, US military members were deeply involved in the training and equipping of both 
the BATF and the FBI Hostage Rescue Team (HRT).  In the staging area for the raids, located at 
Fort Hood, Texas, US Army advisors conducted raid and close-quarters battle exercises with 
both BATF and FBI agents (Blackman & Kopel, 1997).  During both agencies’ operations, 
military tactics were used, including building assaults, a helicopter assault flyover, and CS gas 
saturation.  In addition, military armaments were heavily used, including two M1A1 Abrams 
battle tanks.  The military training and equipment resulted in an over-aggressive mindset and 
execution, which contributed to both the escalation and failure of the raids (Blackman & Kopel, 
1997). 
Police Militarization and the GWOT 
 Although first developed for a “war” on crime and drugs, supporters of police 
paramilitary units (PPUs) such as the FBI HRT cite another reason for their existence: combating 
terrorism.  Even in light of the failures at Waco and Ruby Ridge, police tactical units and law 
enforcement militarization as a whole continue to increase.  The major reason for this trend is the 
threat of terrorism to homeland security.  Grossman and Klinger (2002) argue that ordinary law 
enforcement does not have the capability to defend against a “military-style assault” from 
Islamic terrorism.  The law enforcement term for this type of attack is, “Active shooter” (p. 819).  
The authors support the legalization of direct intervention by the US military forces against 
persons on US soil, regulated by a “probable cause’ standard for determining if said persons 
were acting under foreign terrorism (p. 829).  This mindset, along with recent legislative 
changes, such as the US Patriot Act and 2008 amendment to 10 U.S.C. § 372, suggests that the 
militarization of American law enforcement will continue to increase into the 21st Century. 
Reducing Police Militarization 
 Due to the continuing threat of terrorism, law enforcement militarization will not likely 
desist completely.  However, several steps can be taken in order to control the unchecked 
advance of militarization and its associated negative consequences.  First, PPUs such as the FBI 
HRT and state/local SWAT teams must narrow and re-focus their role.  According to Kraska and 
Cubellis (1997), the number of PPUs in agencies serving small jurisdictions grew 157 percent 
between 1985 and 1995 (as cited in Barlow & Brandl, 2004, p. 388).  Another problem within 
police militarization is the increasing use of tactical units for routine patrol tasks and property 
searches (Parenti, 1999, p. 18).  Between 1985 and 1995, the number of police departments using 
PPUs to serve warrants increased by 342 percent, or mathematically exponentially (as cited in 
Barlow & Brandl, 2004, p. 395).  Police paramilitary units such as SWAT teams can be effective 
when employed in their original, narrow function: crisis situations such as hostage incidents or 
barricaded gunmen (Parenti, 1999, p. 18).  In addition, the American armed services and 
domestic law enforcement must coexist, not merge.  According to Falcone and Smith (2000), the 
military and police can share tactics and techniques without militarization.  As an example, the 
US Army Military Police Corps (MPC) is very similar in practice and execution to the strategy 
of American county sheriff’s offices (p. 247).  This comparison illustrates a more decentralized 
model of law enforcement, as opposed to the traditional “military model hierarchy” followed in 
most large urban departments (p. 254).  The operation and shared training by sheriff’s offices 
and the US Army MPC proves that American armed forces and law enforcement can practice 
interoperability without militarization. 
The Future of Militarization 
 Law enforcement militarization parallels the Crime Control model of criminal justice. 
Amplified by the War on Drugs, militarization is a negative trend in American policing that 
destroys police authority and reduces civil rights for the accused.  However, due to current 
criminal justice polices that support the War on Drugs and GWOT, it is unlikely that police 
militarization will decrease in America.  In order to stem the tide, police organizations must re-
examine the roles of tactical units and work for partnerships with the community.   Without 
departmental efficacy, militarization will continue to cause problems in American law 
enforcement. 
Asset Forfeitures and Seizures 
The DEA has tapped into the valuable resource of asset forfeiture in order to exceed 
annual funding. “By 1987, the Drug Enforcement Administration was effectively paying for 
itself, with seizures exceeding its annual budget. Between 1985 and 1991, the Justice Department 
collected more than $1.5 billion in illegal assets. Over the next five years, the Justice Department 
almost doubled its income…to $2.7 billion in its Asset Forfeiture Fund…The 
Department…regularly exhorted its attorneys to make every effort to increase forfeiture 
production so as to avoid budget shortfalls” (Blumenson & Nilsen, 1998, p.63). 
There is an excess of wealth and attainable profit in police units when they are able to 
single-handedly rake funding. No one wants to settle for less, every officer wants the capitalist 
American Dream, all the money they can get in the easiest way possible.  “According to news 
reports, Louisiana police engaged in massive pretextual stops, with the seized money diverted to 
police department ski trips and other unauthorized uses” (Blumenson & Nilsen, 1998, p.83). 
Furthering the financial standing of their own agencies, police corruption runs rampant in 
departments to aid better working environments for the officers. 
Street level drug busts appease the public outcry and fear about the terrors of drug dealers 
and user. What the public, i.e. white suburbia, doesn’t know is that the real dealers are in their 
neighborhoods. The real dealers don’t deal in plain view; they take their business indoors, in 
cars, at bars, etc. As “Senator-scholar Daniel Patrick (1993) has written, “‘Interdiction and ‘drug 
busts’ are probably necessary symbolic acts, but nothing more.’”(Tonry, M.,2005, p.87).   
The need for making multiple arrests and stops is not just a means of giving a false sense 
of security to Americans, but for sufficient funds for departments. Every time there is a seizure 
of property, the money made from the seizure goes directly to the local department of law 
enforcement, as opposed to the federal funding they receive. The more busts made, the more 
money the department has for its own private funding. As it is told, “One amendment, part of the 
1984 bill (on forfeiture), allowed federal law enforcement agencies to retain and use the proceeds 
from  asset forfeitures, rather than requiring these assets to be deposited in the Treasury’s 
General Fund”(Blumenson & Nilsen,1998, p. 50). Police have been put in a situation where the 
more drug arrests they make the more money they have for their department. It is a lot easier to 
make an “open air” arrest in the urban areas than to obtain search warrants, do surveillance, and 
track suburban drug dealers. As Heather MacDonald explained in a segment about racial 
profiling, “Between 1976 and 1994, 64 percent of the homicide victims in drug turf wars were 
black, according to a Heritage Foundation analysis of FBI data. Sixty-seven percent of the 
perpetrators were black” (Macdonald, 2003, p.19). The black population has been enslaved by a 
substance that has been out of their control. In the late 1980s crack cocaine was introduced to the 
ghettoes and with it came all the crime, i.e. drive-bys, turf wars, and societal damage that is 
equivalent to that of a real war. Before locking away lives that could contribute to society’s 
success, there must be adequate funding for rehabilitation or more programs aimed at giving aid 
to the parts of society that are economically disadvantaged and riddled with these problems.   
Rehabilitative Approach 
Drug busts are a great money making incentive for authorities. With these busts comes 
the forfeiture of property and possessions. The majority of funds used for the “War on Drugs” go 
directly to the police work; not to treatment programs that can help thwart the addiction 
problems of the petty dealers and users on the streets. These small time dealers and users are 
most commonly recidivists a solution for them, as justified by Michael Tonry (2005): “Because 
use and offending tend to coincide in the lives of drug-using offenders, the most effective and 
cost-effective way to deal with such offenders is to get and keep them in well-run treatment 
programs” (Tonry, M.,2005, p.87).  
There needs to be more effective solutions to fighting drugs and drug crimes. The first 
step should be rehabilitating those who are dependent on illicit and illegal substances. Offenders 
and users are one and the same- at least at the smaller levels. For society to attempt to abolish 
drug sales we must first be able to effectively cut off drugs at the smallest retail and usage level 
and allow for people stuck in the grasp of addictive drugs to be offered the option to get off of 
them.  
Increased Incarceration Rates 
The “War on Drugs” has only increased the incarceration rate and minority involvement 
in the criminal justice system. The government portrays a false sense of security; wanting people 
in suburbia and the thriving middle class to think that violent drug users and dealers are being 
put away for the safety of the public. There is a feeling that more drugs are off streets, when in 
reality there are more and they are of greater potency. If there was such a concern for public 
safety there would be more of a focus on alcohol, as it accounts for a number of automobile 
accidents, domestic violence occurrences, and addiction. In the federal prisons “…25% of the 
resident population was drug offenders. By 1992, 58% of the resident population was drug 
offenders. In state prisons, 5.7% of inmates in 1979 were drug offenders, a figure that by 1991 
had climbed to 21.3% to become the single largest category of prisoners…”(Tonry, M.,2005, 
p.92). The incarceration of minorities allows there to be shackles placed on them by the white 
majority. Incarceration is a means of control that is within the bounds of the law with benefits to 
white policy makers who win votes for being “tough on crime” and towns dependent on the 
Prison Industry. Policies evolve from the history and the conglomeration of people in power. 
Along with the conglomeration of ideals comes a mixed opinion on sentencing, discretion, and 
societal reactions to these decisions. This makes its seem like there is an easy objective to 
combat (i.e. drugs), when in reality we (society) are incarcerating great numbers of people 
involved in victimless crimes instead of getting them the help that they need.  
The imbalance in the criminal justice system can be seen after the “War on Drugs” was 
declared and the arrest rates of minorities sky-rocketed. While the numbers of arrested folks of 
all colors are rationalized in proportion to their respective populations, it is the incarceration rate 
that is much higher and severe for the minorities, specifically African-Americans. As Steven 
Cooper wrote, “All indicators suggest that blacks and whites use drugs at approximately the 
same rate, yet blacks are arrested on drug charges at much higher rates than whites” (Cooper, 
S.,1998, p.123). The blacks are racially profiled and targeted by law enforcement, not always on 
a basis of direct discrimination, but because the arresting officer feels he/she has had success 
with a certain race in making drug arrests, i.e. a “good collar.” Most drug arrests are made at the 
discretion of the arresting officer. The belief is that if a pretext stop is made; initiated by a minor 
traffic infraction, there will be reasonable suspicion and thus a means for searching the vehicle. 
This is highly likely if the suspect fits the so-called “thug profile.” This profile does not indicate 
race, but is suggestive of African-Americans, who, more times than not, wear baggy pants, 
backwards caps, dew-rags, undershirts, etc. The imbalance in dealing with the “War on Drugs” 
starts from the point of initial suspicion and profiling to sentencing and incarceration.  
With nearly one in three black men under correctional supervision or control it can be 
alleged with ease that once again blacks have been disenfranchised, discounted from the realm of 
democracy with a political strategy used to make their vote not count. According to the U.S. 
Census Bureau “Thirteen percent of all adult black men – 1.4 million – are 
disenfranchised…Election voting statistics offer an approximation of the political importance of 
black disenfranchisement: 1.4 million black men are disenfranchised compared to 4.6 million 
black men who voted in 1996” (U.S. Census Bureau). 
Institutional Oppression 
Too much of the Drug War is based upon targeting the wrong roots of the drug problem 
in America. Putting the muscle on the street to beat up on small dealers and users isn’t the same 
as having clinics and rehabilitation centers for addicts and people who live and breathe the drugs 
they sell and use. This statement of underfunding is factually supported by the statement that 
claims, “Out of approximately $15 billion in annual federal Drug War funds, approximately two-
thirds are dedicated to law enforcement and interdiction. Meanwhile the slim budgetary 
allotment for the substance abuse…” (Blumenson, Nilsen, 1998, p.80). If politicians and policy 
makers were concerned, and really wanted to put a damper on the use and sale of drugs in the 
United States they would realize the drug war is not a war to be fought with physical force, but 
with rehabilitation and help for people who are over the edge with addiction and the drug 
lifestyle. 
As the case usually is, those who are higher up in the social caste system can get away 
with more criminal behavior. In New Jersey, for example, a defendant facing a drug kingpin 
indictment (twenty-five years to life) obtained a dismissal of that charge and parole eligibility in 
five years on a lesser conviction, by agreeing to forfeit $1 million in assets (Blumenson &  
Nilsen,1998, p. 37). Another case of authorities taking offerings from hustlers can be found in 
the Boston Police Department. “In Massachusetts, a recent investigation by journalists found that 
on average a ‘payment of $50,000 in drug profits won a 6.3 year reduction in a sentence for 
dealers” (Blumenson & Nilsen,1998, p. 37). 
Alcohol Abuse, Prohibition, Drugs & the War on Drugs 
The crime that correlates most directly with drug users and dealers is nowhere near as 
harmful to society as the deviance involved with alcohol use. The drug busts affect the urban 
culture while alcohol is left legal as an abuse and crime promoter in the suburban areas. This 
doesn’t disregard the fact that there are still many alcohol abusers in the city, but there are a lot 
more drug users (that are caught) in the urban environment. This shows a bias in the system, 
allowing drinking to be made legal so that drunks, who act violently, can be punished with fines, 
license suspensions, and metaphorical slaps on the wrist, while drug users and sellers are locked 
up and aren’t allowed to see the light of day. Both the drug addict and the alcoholic suffer from a 
genetic addiction; a physical and mental addiction to a substance that controls every facet of their 
lives.  
The War on Drugs is not effectively combating crime…alcohol poses more of a threat to 
citizens’ safety than drugs. Alcohol related incidents of crime and accidents are much higher 
than those of drug related incidents. More people die in car accidents with intoxicated drivers 
than people smoking a joint on the road. That is not advocating the legalization of drugs; it’s just 
blatantly obvious that alcohol has more of an impact on criminal behavior in the United States 
than people on drugs. Drunks are to blame for most domestic violence problems and the calling 
of Child Protective Services. If the pedophile uncle of the family was stoned he’d be more likely 
to watch cartoons and take naps vs. the drunken uncle who wants to cop a feel off his young 
niece. The effects of alcohol are clearly outlined as having “affects (on) attention, cognition, and 
perception, resulting in a narrowing of the field of attention/ vision. This, in turn, may lead to 
misperceptions of others’ intentions and a reduction in the ability to solve problems such that an 
intoxicated person is more likely to interpret a comment …arguments escalate into physical 
violence” (Martin, Maxwell, White & Zhang, 2004, p.19).  
  Like drugs alcohol can have a “broken windows” effect on a community. Drunks and 
drug users loitering can diminish a small community’s sense of pride and appearance, making it 
more susceptible to criminal activity.  “‘Areas with high outlet density recently have been shown 
to be associated with elevated rates of violence (Costanza et al., 2001).’In addition, such outlets 
no only sell alcohol, but are social magnets that attract undesirable clientele and often become 
sites for drug dealing, prostitution, and other illegal activities…” (Martin, Maxwell,White & 
Zhang, 2004,p.20). There are support and rehabilitation programs for alcoholics that seem to 
work wonders, due to proper funding and societal support. Instead of keeping drug users as 
societal skeletons in the closet, we should support the idea that drug users, like alcoholics, can be 
rehabilitated and placed back in society.  
 
 
Global Intervention & “Containment” 
The foreign policy initiatives call for the containment of the means of production followed by the 
geographical displacement, i.e. shifting of the global market from places where production is 
seen as a cash crop and a means of obtaining wealth, and of course being in a region that is 
favorable and fit for growing crops such as opium. This is well discussed on page 216 in the 
World Drug Report 2008. The Opium problem has successfully been pushed through Southwest 
Asia, from China to Myanmar, and now into Afghanistan (World Drug Report 2008, p.216). This 
displacement shift results in a wild goose chase between cartels and international law 
enforcement.  
One consequence most noted on the global scale was that the control of one market’s 
production, resulting in the control of both the supply and demand, would result in users having 
to switch to another market- a new drug of choice. (World Drug Report 2008, p.216).  Certain 
markets are easier to control. The comparison was made in the prior mentioned report that 
cocaine is easier to control than methamphetamines because the production site and the 
consumer region are so far apart, e.g. Colombia and Los Angeles- there is a great span the drugs 
have to travel before getting to their buyer/consumer, whereas methamphetamines can be 
produced and distributed in small communities- commonly being seen as a growing problem in 
rural America.  
Economic Implications in the War on Drugs 
The dealers that are being taken off the streets are the small time dealers. They are 
arrested on a larger scale. The rate of production of illegal drugs and their distribution has only 
increased over the years.  Afghanistan alone from 2006 to 2007 had a 17 percent increase in 
opium production (World Drug Report 2008).  The street-level distributor is the bottom of the 
food chain in distribution. They are the peons that have no other means of an income due to 
stigma placed on them from institutionalization. Deterrence by itself is not an effective approach 
to thwarting the Drug Trade “Large-scale arrests have repeatedly been shown to have little or no 
effect on the volume of drug trafficking or on retail prices of drugs” (Tonry, M.,2005,p.87).  The 
global illicit drug retail market, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), was valued at $322 billion (World Drug Report 2005). This would be a major 
incentive to not disrupt the distribution among large-scale dealers. 
Despite the ongoing effort of the west to thwart drug production related terrorism in 
Afghanistan, the UN Office of Drug Control reports in its World Drug Report 2008 a steady 
increase in the production and distribution of Opium in Mesopotamia.  (World Drug Report 
2008). 
Money Laundering 
One of the main efforts put forth in the international War on Drugs is the prevention of 
money-laundering. According to the American Banker’s Banker Glossary, Money Laundering is 
defined as: The conversion or transfer of property derived from a criminal offense for the 
purpose of concealing, or disguising, the illicit origin of the property. (American Banker, 2008). 
Big time drug dealers have an easy time laundering money because not only has the law 
been able to protect them, but they can afford the attorneys to do the legal work. The law has, in 
recent years, made it harder to prove laundering. 
Conclusion 
The War on Drugs has had enormous repercussions on the American way of life.  
Limitations have been placed on the liberty of the individual as well as the community, all in the 
name of protecting the population from the evil of narcotics.  Militarization has evolved 
American police into a quasi-military branch able to operate inside the United States with little 
oversight.  Most drug enforcement is targeted at the poor, mainly minority populations of 
America, who use narcotics.  When drugs do get in to the hands of individuals and they are 
caught, the full arm of the law is emplaced upon them.  Rather than try and rehabilitate addicts, 
they are simply warehoused in American’s enormous prison industry.  This endless cycle has 
resulted in the disenfranchisement of large portions of non-white America.   
When law enforcement fails, American sons are sent to fight wars in foreign lands to 
reduce the flow of narcotics into America.  Does the failure of our border agents constitute a full 
regime change in a legitimate country?  Even when full war is not employed, America maintains 
a long list of various agencies, which operate essentially as spies in order to “assist” other 
countries with their drug problem. 
Luckily, the effects of the War on Drugs are reversible, or at least modifiable.  While 
total legalization of all narcotics is not likely, and would have its own list of repercussions, 
moderation is possible.  First, the extended use of prisons only hides the problem from the 
public, not fixes it.  Prison sentences need to be reduced; this could be best accomplished with 
community involvement, and greater research into rehabilitation programs. 
Drugs, like guns and alcohol, will always be part of American culture.  The question that 
remains is how to limit them.  Lax controls and one ends up with an epidemic.  Strict controls 
result in underground markets and enormous law enforcement expenses.  A successful balance 
needs to be established that limits the most harmful narcotics, rehabilitates those already 
addicted, and eliminates racial discrepancies.  All of these goals must be accomplished while 
being cost-effective to the American taxpayer.  
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